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Abstract 
Incentive regulation in electricity distribution is expected to enlarge its scope, from an input-
oriented instrument to one that includes additional, output-based incentives. This creates a 
potential conflict with more traditional concerns for productive efficiency. In the case of Italy, 
together with input-oriented instruments, output-based incentives have been applied to 
indicators of quality for over a decade. Using micro-data from the largest Italian distribution 
company, we conduct an assessment of the effects of this regulatory framework. The aim of 
this word is threefold. First, we measure performance in terms of cost-efficiency and find that 
similar cost-reducing efforts were exercised in all distribution units. Second, we measure 
performance with respect to the overall regulatory framework. Using quality-related rewards 
and penalties, we find that more cost-efficient areas were also more successful in earning 
rewards/avoiding penalties: favorable external conditions have similar, positive effects on 
both cost and quality performance. Using the cost of the energy not supplied, we find no 
evidence of a conflict between cost efficiency and social cost efficiency. Results indicate, 
however, that is preferable to use social costs when measuring a single unit’s performance. 
From these results we derive specific policy indications. 
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1. Introduction 
Current technical changes in electricity distribution networks prompted a lively 
debate, in Europe and elsewhere, on how incentive regulation should evolve. Since 
liberalization, regulatory incentives have focused almost exclusively on the use of 
inputs (operational and capital expenditures). Current concerns for network 
innovation and sustainability are being addressed, instead, with incentives that focus 
on outputs measures of companies’ performance (network reliability, environmental 
impact, ability to connect dispersed generation, etc.). The best-known example in this 
regard is the new regulatory scheme recently adopted by Ofgem, the Revenue, 
Innovation, Incentives and Output (RIIO) model (Ofgem, 2010); the Italian regulatory 
authority and other regulatory agencies, for instance the Australian energy regulator, 
are moving in this direction as well (AEEG, 2011a; ACCC/AER, 2012). 
On the one hand, given the regulator’s asymmetry of information, output-based 
regulation has an important advantage: leaving the decision on the use of the 
resources to the regulated firm, it minimizes inefficiencies in the use of inputs. On the 
other hand, it forces the regulated firm to increase expenditures, to meet the additional 
goals set by the regulator (in contrast with the cost efficiency objective). Moreover, it 
presents implementation complexities and requires adequate regulatory powers, 
budget and skills (Glachant et al., 2012).  
In the case of Italy, together with incentives aimed at productive efficiency, output-
based incentives have been applied to indicators of quality for over a decade. Under 
the current regulatory reform, this represents an interesting case to investigate how a 
regulated firm responds to such a incentive scheme. The debate around this issue is, 
indeed, quite recent (Coelli et al., 2013; Growitsch et al., 2010; Jamasb et al., 2012).  
Moreover, when network operators are required to meet potentially conflicting 
objectives, also the assessment of their performance becomes more complex. Since 
the adoption of incentive regulation in infrastructure industries, benchmarking 
analysis has been extensively used to measure firms’ efficiency (Jamasb and Pollit, 
2001; Joskow, 2008; Haney and Pollit, 2009). Nevertheless, the question of including 
additional output measures of performance (e.g., quality of supply) has been scarcely 
explored by regulatory authorities and academics as well. 
Finally, as for Italy in particular, anecdotic evidence indicates that after a period of 
rapid increase in performance, the level of quality varied at a much slower pace, while 
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the rules for assigning output-based incentives have remained unchanged.2 Although 
from a technological perspective such a trend is to be expected, it has also prompted 
the question of how this regulatory scheme should evolve in the future.  
In this paper we address all three issues mentioned above.  
We investigate how the largest Italian electricity distribution company has 
responded to the input-based and output-based incentives provided by the current 
regulatory framework. To our knowledge, this is the first assessment of this incentive 
regime since its introduction in the year 2000. To this end, we exploit on an original 
dataset, constructed with the support of the Italian regulatory authority (Autorità per 
l’energia elettrica e il gas, AEEG), by means of a dedicated data collection. It is a 
comprehensive and balanced panel for 115 distribution units (Zones), tracked from 
2004 to 2009, which includes the amounts annually received in rewards (paid in 
penalties) for exceeding (failing to meet) quality-specific targets.  
As for the analysis, we rely on a benchmarking approach and contribute to the 
debate regarding the inclusion of additional measures of performance. Specifically, 
we use two alternative measures of quality that provide different and complementary 
information regarding the efficiency of the observed distribution unit: in one case, 
efficiency is estimated in terms of response to regulatory incentives; in the second, in 
terms of social costs. While latter was used in previous literature, the former has 
never been studied. From a methodological perspective, we apply a recent approach 
based on a two-stage, semi-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
bootstrapping techniques, where technical efficiency is estimated in the first stage and 
then regressed on a set of external variables in the second stage (Simar and Wilson, 
2007). We also study the evolution of performance over time by means of Malmquist 
indices. 
Our main finding is that the presence of quality regulation has not significantly 
altered the distribution units’ behavior: those that responded well to cost efficiency 
incentives, responded equally well to quality-related incentives and vice versa. After 
all, favorable external variables that have a significant and positive effect on cost 
efficiency (area size, load composition and network design) also influence the ability 
of a distribution unit to exceed the targets imposed by quality regulation. 
                                                 
2 In the first regulatory period (2000-2003) the national average duration of interruptions per customer 
decreased by over 60 minutes; in the second period (2004-2007) the improvement amounted to less 
than 20 minutes and, in the third period (2008-2011), to about 10 minutes. 
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Nevertheless, this response to regulatory incentives appears in contrast with the long 
term objective of quality regulation in Italy (convergence in performance). Hence, on 
the basis of the evidence provided throughout the paper, we derive two policy 
suggestions for the development of quality regulation, respectively, in the medium 
and in the long term.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature on benchmarking analysis in electricity distribution; Section 3 outlines the 
Italian regulatory framework; Section 4 presents the empirical methodology; Section 
5 describes the dataset and presents our choice of variables for the benchmarking 
analysis; Section 6 discusses results in the context of the existing literature and 
derives policy implications; Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Selected literature review  
A relatively small number of papers analyzes efficiency in the electricity 
distribution sector using a benchmarking model which includes an indicator of service 
quality. While Table 1 summarizes all the main contributions with these 
characteristics, we concentrate here on five studies based on panel data.3  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A first strand of literature focuses on performance measurements and explores one 
main question, namely, the potential trade-off between cost savings and the level of 
service quality at firm level (i.e. the effects of incentive regulation on service quality). 
Additional questions explored in this literature regard: (i) the use of an integrated 
cost-and-quality benchmarking model vs. a cost-only approach, when assessing the 
progress of an incentive regulation regime and (ii) the analysis of productivity 
changes over time. The existing empirical studies do not provide clear cut evidence 
on any of these issues. 
                                                 
3 Benchmarking studies in electricity distribution which include a measure of quality, but rely on a 
cross-sectional sample, include the work by Jamasb and Pollit (2003) on 1999 international data, by 
von Hirschhausen et al. (2006) on 2001 German data (where quality is measured by network losses), 
and by Growitsch at al. (2009) on 2002 international data (where quality is measured by customer 
minutes lost). 
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Using a panel of 14 electricity distribution utilities in the UK (tracked from 
1991/92 to 1998/99) Giannakis et al. (2005) find that efficiency scores of cost-only 
DEA models do not show a high correlation with those of quality-based models 
(where quality is measured by the number and duration of service interruptions). In 
other words, cost-efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit high service quality. 
Malmquist indexes indicate, however, that improvements in service quality have 
made a significant contribution to the sector’s total productivity change. The authors 
conclude that is “desirable to integrate quality of service […] in benchmarking […] of 
electricity networks” (Giannakis et al., 2005, page 2269). Coelli et al. (2007) measure 
the efficiency of 92 French electricity distribution units (tracked from 2003 to 2005), 
all belonging to the same distribution company. By employing both a stochastic 
frontier and a DEA approach, they show that the inclusion of the quality variable 
(number of interruptions) has no significant effect on estimated efficiency scores. 
They deduce that including a quality aspect in an efficiency benchmarking is 
“unlikely to have a substantial effect upon price regulation outcomes” (Coelli et al., 
2007, page 17). Productivity changes are the main focus of the work by Miguéis et al. 
(2012). Employing a sample of 127 Norwegian distribution companies (tracked from 
2004 to 2007) the authors estimate both efficiency scores and Malmquist indexes 
using a multiple-output, single input DEA model. Several topological and 
geographical variables are included as outputs and quality is included as an input 
which adds to the utilities’ costs (i.e. quality is measured by the value of the Energy 
Not Served – ENS). Contrary to Giannakis et al. (2005), the authors find no evidence 
of a significant technology change over time (but do not estimate a cost-only model). 
Also, none of the factors considered in a second-stage regression is found to have a 
significant effect on efficiency scores. 
More recent papers have taken a different perspective. The main focus is no longer 
on the effect of incentive regulation on the level of service quality, but on the impact 
of quality regulation on firm performance, in terms of cost efficiency or in terms of 
quality provision. Such a change is clearly motivated by a wider adoption of quality 
regulation in European countries. 
Growitsch et al. (2010) use a panel dataset for 131 Norwegian distribution network 
operators observed over the period 2001 (the year quality regulation was introduced) 
to 2004. Comparing the efficiency scores of a cost-only and a cost-and-quality DEA 
model they find no systematic differences between the two (quality is measured by 
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the value of the ENS). Their results suggest that the introduction of quality regulation 
in Norway did not have a strong impact on firm's performance nor it conflicted with 
cost efficiency of electricity distributors. Coelli et al. (2013) employ a parametric 
distance function approach and a panel of 92 distribution units, all belonging to the 
main distribution company in France (tracked from 2003 to 2005). They conduct a 
study of the production technology and propose a methodology to estimate the 
operating cost of preventing one interruption. Their suggestion is to calculate this cost 
using more recent data and to use it to predict the efficacy of the quality-related 
incentives introduced in France in 2009.  
Our analysis of the Italian distribution sector is closer to the more recent empirical 
studies, i.e. it concerns distribution units that have been subject to price and quality 
incentive regulation and focuses on assessing the progress of both regulatory regimes. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this appears to be the 
first study to examine the Italian distribution sector after the introduction of incentive 
regulation in the year 2000.4 Second, we propose two different (monetary) valuation 
of service quality for inclusion in the cost-and-quality benchmarking models. One 
measure has been used in studies on Norwegian data (the value of the ENS). The 
other is novel and it is the rewards and penalties actually paid by or received from the 
regulatory authority for, respectively, exceeding or failing to meet the quality targets 
set for each distribution unit. Third, we use a recent methodology to analyze the 
determinants of the heterogeneity in performance in both the cost-only and the cost-
and-quality models. To this end, we consider several explanatory variables that were 
either identified in previous studies, or that we identified as potentially significant on 
the basis of additional tests performed on our database. Finally, we devote particular 
attention to policy implications. 
 
 
3. The regulatory framework 
In Italy, in 2009, there were over 150 Distribution System Operators (DSO), that 
delivered a total volume of 279 TWh. The largest company, Enel Distribuzione, was 
responsible for 86.2% of the distributed energy, followed by A2A Reti Elettriche 
(4.1%), Acea Distribuzione (3.6%) and Aem Torino Distribuzione (1.3%); the other 
                                                 
4 Benchmarking analyses on Italian data are all prior to this date (e.g., Scarsi, 1999). 
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operators held marginal quotas (less than 1% in volumes). Enel was present over the 
entire national territory and it was organized in four Macro Areas, eleven Territorial 
Units and 115 Zones (each Territorial Unit has its local managers and coordination is 
ensured at the level of Macro Areas).  
DSOs are regulated by AEEG. Since the year 2000, an incentive-based mechanism 
applies (with a four-year regulatory period), with the objective to stimulate productive 
efficiency, investments and service quality. As for productive efficiency and 
investments, operational expenditures are required to decrease with an X efficiency 
factor while, starting from the second regulatory period (2004), the cost of capital is 
directly passed through to consumers.5 Note that the decision to pass-through all 
capital expenses was taken by the government and not by the regulator (Law n. 
290/2003). Moreover, since 2008, several, specific investments benefit from an 
increase in Weighted Average Capital Cost for period of 8 to 12 years (a plus 2% over 
the ordinary return). These include investments in low-losses transformers and in 
automation and control of active grids.6  
As far as quality is concerned, in the year 2000 AEEG introduced a reward and 
penalty scheme that linked the distribution tariff to an output measure of continuity of 
supply: the average number of minutes lost per customer for long (longer than 3 
minutes), unplanned interruptions.7 This indicator, SAIDI, is measured separately in 
more than 300 territorial districts, covering the entire national territory.8 Rewards and 
penalties are calculated per district on an annual basis, as a function of the difference 
between a target-SAIDI and the actual-SAIDI (targets are defined separately for each 
territorial district and year). The distribution tariff is unique across the entire national 
territory and it is adjusted yearly on the basis of companies’ performances: it 
                                                 
5 For the second tariff period the Weighted Average Capital Cost (WACC) was set at 6.8% and the X 
factor at 3.5%. For the third period (2008-2011) the WACC was increased to 7% and the X factor was 
decreased to 1.9%. Details on the choice of the WACC and X factors in the energy sector can be found 
in Cambini and Rondi (2010).  
6 Further details on the evolution of the Italian regulatory framework can be found in Lo Schiavo et al. 
(2013). 
7 Continuity of supply is described by the number and duration of supply interruptions. For a given 
distribution area and time period, the average duration of long interruptions per consumer (or customer 
minutes lost) is measured by SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index), the average 
number of long interruptions per customer by SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index), 
and the average number of short (shorter than 3 minutes and longer than 1 second) interruptions per 
customer by MAIFI (Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index). 
8 Each district includes municipalities that are homogeneous in population density, that are located in 
the same administrative province and whose network is managed by the same distribution company. 
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increases when, on average, quality has improved more than required (rewards earned 
by all districts in the country are greater than total penalties paid) and vice versa. 
Because of the uniqueness of the distribution tariff, beginning with the second 
regulatory period, target-SAIDIs are calculated using a formula that assumes a 
convergence in performance of all districts with equal population density to the same 
quality level (the national standard) in the medium term (12 years) – there are three 
levels of density and better continuity is expected in more densely populated areas. 
This approach enables the regulator to set more ambitious targets for districts that are 
initially under-performing with respect to national standards and vice versa. Also, in 
line with the indications of the literature, the results of a customer survey are used to 
define penalties and rewards (Sappington, 2005). Two different valuations of quality 
are considered, to reflect the different willingness to pay (WTP) for quality of 
residential and non-residential customers (see Section 5.1).  
 
 
4. Methodology 
For the purpose of this study we employ a two-stage DEA estimation, based on the 
semi-parametric approach proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). Accordingly, 
technical efficiency is estimated in a first stage and regressed on a set of external 
variables in a second stage. This accounts for possible sources of inefficiency 
heterogeneity among different units of observation. Moreover, bootstrapping 
techniques are used in both stages to overcome other issues related to the traditional 
procedure, i.e. the uncertainty associated with DEA efficiency scores in the first stage 
and their serial correlation in the second stage.  
More specifically, assuming that all units of observation share the same production 
technology, the first stage is devoted to the estimation of the technology frontier and 
to the measurement of each unit’s efficiency, as their distance from the same frontier. 
Given a distribution unit which uses a set of inputs (x) to produce a set of outputs (y) 
via a known production technology, the unit’s efficiency is measured as an input 
distance function (Shephard, 1970).9 This is defined on the input set L(y) as: 
 
                                                 
9 In electricity distribution it is fair to assume that demand is mostly beyond the control of the firm, 
hence the choice, in line with the literature, to use an input-oriented model. 
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(1)
 
where L(y) represents the set of all input vectors, x, which can produce the output 
vector, y, and ρ is the input distance measure, i.e., for a each distribution unit 1/ρ 
represents the amount by which the observed inputs can be proportionally reduced, 
while still producing the same output level. The distance function will take a value 
which is greater than or equal to one if the input vector x is an element of the feasible 
input set, L(y), that is: 
 
 
(2)
 
The distance function will take a value of unity if the input vector is located on the 
inner boundary of the input set (Coelli et al, 2005).  
Normally, the production technology is unknown and its estimation is required. 
This can be done using different approaches. The well-known advantages of using 
DEA include the absence of any assumptions on the functional form of the production 
frontier and the possibility to simultaneously use multiple inputs and outputs. Thus, in 
the first stage, we employ DEA to construct the frontier surface using linear 
programming methods and to compute technical efficiency scores (they are obtained 
as a by-product of the frontier construction process). Assuming that each unit of 
observation i uses K inputs to produce M outputs, we indicate with X the KxN matrix 
of inputs, whose columns are the input vectors xi of all N units. Similarly, we indicate 
with Y the MxN matrix of outputs that contains the N output vectors yi. The input-
oriented, Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) frontier is estimated by solving N linear 
programs of the following form: 
 
 
(3)
 
(xy) = ¶ρ : (xρ)∈(y)♦
(xy) = ¶ρ : (xρ)∈(y)♦
ρλ ρ
s.t .
− y +Yλ  0
x
ρ − Xλ  0
λ  0
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where 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞ and  is an Nx1 vector of constants.10 
One of the well known limitations of DEA is its potentially biased estimation due 
to the uncertainty associated with sampling variation. We control for the uncertainty 
of DEA scores in the first stage by estimating their bias and confidence intervals 
using a consistent bootstrap approximation of the efficiency distribution (Simar and 
Wilson, 2000).  
A second limitation of DEA is its deterministic nature (all the distances from the 
efficient frontier are assumed to be inefficiency). In this regard, we note that while 
parametric methods allow for a random unobserved heterogeneity among different 
units of observation, they also require several assumptions, regarding the specific 
functional form of the production function, the distribution form of the inefficiency 
and of the statistical noise. Estimated efficiency scores are, of course, sensitive to 
these specifications (Coelli et al., 2005).11 Considering the purpose of our analysis 
and the characteristics of our dataset (which includes data from a single distribution 
company) a non-parametric approach was the preferred choice for the present work. 
Nevertheless, in the second stage, the efficiency of each unit of observation is 
regressed on a set of external variables. In other words, the bias-correct efficiency 
scores estimated in the first stage are used as dependent variables in a second stage 
regression analysis. To consistently estimate the regression parameters we apply a 
truncated regression and, following Simar and Wilson (2007), we also use a bootstrap 
approach for inference. The latter consistently accounts for the serial correlation 
structure of DEA efficiency scores. 
Input distance functions are also used to measure productivity changes between 
two points in time. To this end, we resort to the Malmquist index (M) proposed by 
Caves et al. (1982). For each unit of observation, this can be expressed as: 
 
 
(4)
 
                                                 
10 Note that the distribution operator can choose its internal organization, in particular regarding the 
size of the distribution Zones: this motivates our choice of a CRS assumption (moreover, our results 
show an average scale efficiency always above 93%). 
11 This method is employed in several benchmarking studies regarding the electricity distribution 
sector, including Estache et al. (2004), Farsi and Filippini (2004), Farsi et al. (2006) and Growitsch et 
al. (2009). 
 = 
(yx)
(y+1x+1) ≤
+1(yx)
+1(y+1x+1)
12
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where dt(yt, xt) is the input distance function in time period t in relation to the 
production technology at time t and dt(yt+1, xt+1) is the input distance function in time 
period t in relation to the production technology at time t+1; dt+1(yt, xt) and dt+1(yt+1, 
xt+1) are similarly defined.12  
Malmquist indices can assume values that are smaller or greater than unity. A 
Malmquist index greater than one indicates a productivity growth from year t to year 
t+1; conversely an index Mi smaller than one indicates a productivity decline. 
Moreover, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, a Malmquist index can 
be decomposed in two components, or possible sources of productivity change: an 
efficiency change and a technical change (Färe et al., 1994). That is: 
 
 
(5)
 
The first component in (5) represents the efficiency change EC from year t to year 
t+1 and measures the extent to which a unit has moved closer to the frontier. The 
second component in (5) is the technical change TC. For a given sample, a TC greater 
than unity indicates an industry-level technological progress and vice versa.  
 
 
5. Data set and cost models  
Our dataset was built with the support of the Italian regulatory authority, by means 
of a dedicated data collection. It is a comprehensive and balanced panel for 115 
Zones, that belongs to Enel Distribuzione, tracked from 2004 to 2009. Given the 
volume of energy distributed by Enel and the geographic extension of its distribution 
territory, it can be considered a good representation of the entire country. 
As for technical variables, the dataset includes, for each Zone, the number of Low 
Voltage (LV) customers, the energy consumed by LV residential and non-residential 
users and by Medium Voltage (MV) consumers, the area served (in km2), 
transformers’ capacity for primary and secondary substations (in MVA) and network 
length (in km, for MV and LV, cable and overhead lines). Accounting data are given 
                                                 
12 In practice, Malmquist indices require the estimation of two single period and two mixed period 
distance functions. To this end, we employ, with the necessary modifications, CRS DEA models of the 
type described in equation (3). Also Malmquist indices are computed using a bootstrap procedure. 
 = 
(yx)
+1(y+1x+1) ≤
+1(y+1x+1)
(y+1x+1) ≤
+1(yx)
(yx)
12
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in terms of annual revenues, asset values (detailed for primary and secondary 
substations, MV and LV feeders and for points of connection) and operating costs 
(which include labor, services, materials and other costs). 
In addition, AEEG provided data on customer minutes lost for long interruptions 
(SAIDI) as well as on the frequency of long and short interruptions (SAIFI and 
MAIFI, respectively).13 A key novelty of our dataset is the detailed information on the 
amounts annually received in rewards (paid in penalties) for out-performing (under-
performing) with respect to the regulatory standards. Continuity of supply data 
(indicators as well as rewards and penalties) were given per territorial district, which 
are geographically smaller than Zones. To ensure coherence with the other variables 
in the dataset, continuity data had thus to be calculated per Zone, aggregating district 
data. This means that, inevitably, the relation between population density and 
continuity of supply became less precise.  
The benchmarking analysis is conducted on 114 units (one Zone was dropped 
because of a major asset divestiture), a sample size that is comparable with those of 
the most recent studies (see Section 2). All units of observation belong to the same 
distribution company as in Coelli et al. (2007) and Coelli et al. (2013), but are 
observed over a longer period (six vs. three years). In the following we motivate our 
choice of variables for the benchmarking models. While our choice of monetary 
variables as inputs (vs. physical units) is in line with the most recent literature, we 
provide a rather strong motivation for our preference. We also illustrate some 
descriptive statistics, derive hypotheses on estimation results and identify candidate 
determinants of inefficiencies.  
 
5.1 Selected inputs and outputs  
The selection of input and output variables is crucial to the validity of a DEA 
model. On the basis of previous work and our knowledge of the distribution activity, 
we define a first model with energy consumption (energyit) and number of LV 
consumers (LVconsit) as the outputs for Zone i in year t. As known, the energy 
requested by final users is not under the control of a DSO. Similarly, all requests for 
connection must be met by the distributor (within certain technical limits). Our choice 
                                                 
13 Actual SAIDI used for regulatory purposes does not include interruption events that originated on 
the transmission network or that were caused by Force Majeure. The same assumption holds in this 
paper. 
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of inputs includes capital and non-capital variables (operating costs). Following Coelli 
et al. (2005), capital (capitalit) is measured using gross asset value (substations, 
feeders and points of connection) and not capital expenditures. This is to avoid 
penalizing a Zone for making recent investments. As for non-capital input, we 
included labor (the main voice), services, materials and other operating costs – and 
excluded depreciation and taxes (opcostit).14 
The use of monetary inputs is justified by the fact that we are observing a single 
company and therefore we can reasonably assume that the price of goods, services 
and labor is the same for all Zones. Moreover, we are studying performance with 
respect to regulatory incentives: since one of the primary aims of the regulation was 
to create stimuli for productive efficiency (in operating costs), the use of monetary 
variables as inputs seems appropriate. 
Nevertheless, given the amplitude of our dataset, we considered building an 
alternative benchmarking model, where input variables were expressed in terms of 
physical units. In analogy with the “monetary” model, capital input was measured by 
transformer capacity (in MVA) and network length (in km), while operating costs 
were approximated by the number of employees. Nevertheless, this model was less 
convincing for various reasons. Recall that a DEA model finds the units of 
observation that are efficient with respect to a combination of input-output ratios. As 
for the number of employees, it seems reasonable to define efficient a distribution unit 
that minimizes the number of workers per consumer, or per energy delivered. 
Similarly, as for network length, it sounds reasonable to label as more efficient a 
distribution unit with less km of feeders per customer. On the contrary, it is more 
difficult to argue that a distribution unit is more efficient than another because it is 
characterized by less km of feeders per MWh delivered. The interpretation becomes 
even more difficult when dealing with transformer capacities. While a Zone with an 
adequate installed transformation capacity per MWh delivered is indeed efficient, 
there is no practical meaning in labeling as efficient a unit that minimizes its 
transformer capacity per customer (remember that we are including in the model only 
the number of LV customers). In sum, when using technical input variables it seemed 
                                                 
14 This model does not account for variables that are beyond the influence of the company (observable 
heterogeneity). Typical external variables in the distribution sector include geographic and climatic 
factors (altitude, costal areas, snow, etc.). Previous studies have shown that these are not relevant for 
Italy (Scarsi, 1999). In this work we will explore only the effect of load-related and network-related 
variables that are outside the control of the distribution unit (see Section 5.3).  
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inevitable to incur in input-output combinations that had little practical significance 
(network length per MWh or transformer capacity per LV customer). Hence, we 
opted for the “monetary” model specified above.15 
As for the inclusion of quality, and in line with the choice of a “monetary” model, 
we consider the two following options: 
 to substitute opcostit with a new variable, opcost_RPit, sum of opcostit plus 
penalties paid and minus rewards received (RP); as a consequence, Zones that 
receive rewards (i.e. present higher levels of quality than requested by the 
regulator) are expected to be relatively more efficient;  
 to substitute opcostit with a new variable, opcost_ENSit, sum of opcostit plus the 
cost of the ENS; in this way, Zones with lower levels of ENS are expected to 
be relatively more efficient. 
To derive the cost of ENS (C_ENSit) for Zone i and year t we employ:  
 the actual value of SAIDIit per Zone i and year t;   
 the WTP parameters indicated by the Italian regulatory authority: C1 for 
residential users and C2 for non-residential ones or, respectively, 18 and 36 
c€/(min·kW) (AEEG, 2007); 
 the residential (res_energyit) and non-residential (nonres_energyit) consumption 
per Zone and year (in MWh). 
From these, the cost of ENS is calculated as: 
 
(6)
 
Note that also regulatory rewards and penalties are calculated, per district, as in 
equation (6). To this end, however, SAIDIit is replaced by the distance between the 
actual-SAIDI and the target-SAIDI for the district and year.16  
In sum, as summarized in Table 2, we estimate three DEA models. With the Cost-
only model we measure performance with respect to the regulation of inputs (cost 
                                                 
15 Efficiency scores estimated using a “non-monetary” model are available from the authors upon 
request. 
16 In the regulatory practice, other information enter this calculation. For instance, annual rewards and 
penalties are capped and a two-year average value is used as the actual-SAIDI. All the details can be 
found in the Regulatory Orders n. 4/04 and 333/07 (AEEG, 2004; AEEG, 2007).  
  
C _ ENSit  SAIDIit  C1 res _energyit8.76 C2 
nonres_energyit
8.76




 15
efficiency).17 With the CostRP model we measure performance with respect to the 
overall regulatory framework, that includes price and quality incentive schemes 
(regulatory efficiency). With the CostENS model, performance is measured with 
respect to social costs, sum of the company’s cost and the cost incurred by consumers 
for the ENS (social cost efficiency). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the input and output variables used in the 
three models. Table 4 provides yearly average values of the same variables, as well as 
their annual, relative standard deviations (in %). 18  Statistics include also several 
quality indicators; note that RP is the only variable that assumes both positive 
(rewards) and negative (penalties) values. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In terms of outputs, average energy consumption has increased from 2004 to 2008 
and decreased in 2009 because of the economic crisis. Also the number of consumers 
has grown in the observed period (an internal recalculation by Enel explains why this 
number is lower in 2008). As for inputs, the total gross value of the assets has steadily 
increased, while we observe a reduction in operating costs between 2004 and 2008 
(and an increase in 2009), mainly due to a reduction in labor costs over the same 
period (partially compensated by increasing costs for services). Differences among 
Zones (relative standard deviations) remain fairly stable over time.  
While trends in opcost_RP and opcost_ENS are well explained by changes in the 
operating cost variable, it is interesting to look more closely at quality indicators. 
                                                 
17 In practice, the revenues of a distribution unit are modified by quality-related rewards and penalties. 
Hence, the cost model leaves out costs (and benefits) that derive from quality regulation. 
18 The relative standard deviation is obtained by multiplying the standard deviation by 100 and dividing 
this product by the average value of the variable. 
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SAIDI values steadily improved over the observed period.19 More specifically, the 
first three years of data reveal a significant decline in customer minutes lost, from a 
zonal (arithmetic) mean of 73.56 min. in 2004 to 51.06 min. in 2006. In the following 
years we do not observe a comparable trend: SAIDI in 2009 was equal to 47.73 min. 
and an increase was registered in 2008.  
As for RP, Table 4 shows that, on average, net rewards have constantly increased 
in the second tariff period (2004-2007). An initial large reduction in customer minutes 
lost, even if followed by relative stability, explains why incentives have continued to 
growth: a large initial improvement normally ensures that a district meets the quality 
targets for the rest of the tariff period. On the contrary, in the years 2008 and 2009, 
RP were significantly lower because of two effects: first, the recalculation of the 
starting point that, at the beginning of each tariff period, fixes the initial target-SAIDI 
at the same level of the actual-SAIDI for all districts and, second, the absence of a 
significant decline in customer minutes lost. Average RP values show also  
particularly large relative standard deviations. 
The cost of ENS (C_ENS) follows the trend in customer minutes lost: significant 
reductions in 2005 and in 2006, relatively smaller decreases in 2007 and in 2009 as 
well as an increase in 2008. Zonal differences (relative standard deviations), are 
similar at the beginning and at the end of the sample period (they present a minimum 
in 2005 and a peak in 2007). 
 
5.3 Hypotheses on benchmarking results and determinants of inefficiencies  
Considering first the Cost-only model, the relative standard deviations in Table 4 
suggest that cost-efficiency might not be particularly high, nor significantly converge 
over time. Nevertheless, we need to consider the possibility that differences across 
Zones are related to variables outside the control of the DSO.  
For instance, the surface covered in squared kilometers (area) is a measure of 
network dispersion: operating costs (manly maintenance activities) as well as capital 
costs (length of LV lines) are normally linked to the size of the area served (Coelli et 
al., 2007).  Hence, we expect lower efficiency in larger areas.  
Moreover, standard deviations of the ratios of capital and non-capital inputs over 
number of LV consumers are higher than the corresponding ratios over energy 
                                                 
19 SAIDI data presented an outlier with an extremely high value (698 min.) in 2004. To avoid bias in 
the analysis the variable was winsorized in the upper tail (Dixon, 1960). 
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consumption.20 Assuming a rationale conduct on the part of the DSO, we make the 
hypothesis that distribution costs are strongly driven by the number of customers 
served. Consequently, we expect that Zones where the single customer consumes 
relatively more energy will make a “better” use of their inputs and, therefore, will be 
more efficient. This effect can be captured by the ratio of non-residential consumption 
over total consumption (nonres_cons, in %). A similar effect was found by Scarsi 
(1999) and Filippini and Wild (2001).  
Finally, we consider also the average length of feeders per substation (f_length), 
calculated as the ratio of network length (in km, for MV lines) over transformer 
capacity for primary substations (in MVA).21  Although the variable is ultimately 
defined by investment choices, the number of substations installed is driven by the 
capacity which is necessary to serve the load and it can be modified only in the long 
term. Its impact on efficiency is ambiguous: a higher transformer capacity constitutes 
an additional burden in terms of capital assets, however it might be fully justified by a 
higher demand. The same variable is also closely related to continuity of supply: a 
higher number of substations ensures a higher level of redundancy (less consumers 
affected by the same fault, or for a shorter period of time).22 
As for the CostRP model, three observations are in order. First, RP present the 
largest relative standard deviations in Table 4. Second, as argued above, a good 
explanatory variable for SAIDI is the average length of feeders per substation. Third, 
in addition to changes in SAIDI, regulatory incentives depend on the composition of 
the load (see equation (6)). Altogether, we expect average efficiency scores in the 
CostRP model to differ from those in the Cost-only model and, specifically, to present 
lower values. We also expect that the determinants of inefficiency will include load 
composition and network design. 
The CostENS model is similar to the one studied by Growitsch et al. (2010), which 
employs the same outputs, but a single input, sum of capital and operational expenses, 
plus the costs of ENS. While Growitsch et al. (2010) find no significant differences in 
                                                 
20 On average, the capital ratio on energy consumption has a relative standard deviation equal to 
29.60% while the relative standard deviation of the capital ratio on number of customers is 43.63%. 
The corresponding values for the operating costs are, respectively, 14.82% and 37.23%. 
21 Dividing by the number of primary transformers per Zone would have been more appropriate, but 
our database does not include this information. 
22 The Appendix shows that a good explanatory variable for SAIDI at MV level is, indeed, the average 
length of feeders. Moreover, f_length presents also a high correlation with the percentage of 
underground lines. Grounding of long feeders is not necessarily cost efficient, but underground cables 
are normally associated with a lower probability of fault. 
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average efficiency between their cost-only and a cost-and-quality models, descriptive 
statistics in Table 4 do not immediately indicate an expected outcome for our 
database. Nevertheless, the fact that C_ENS is calculated as in equation (6) suggests 
that differences across Zones might be, again, related to the average length of feeders 
and to the composition of the load.  
 
 
6. Results  
In this section we focus, first, on the Cost-only model and analyze distribution 
units’ performance in terms of cost efficiency (i.e. we study the effect of input-based 
incentives). To this end, we investigate also the role of external variables and estimate 
productivity changes over time. Secondly, we analyze the combined effect of input-
based and output-based (quality-specific) regulation, using the two cost-and-quality 
models. Also in this case we consider possible determinants of inefficiency (and 
estimate productivity changes over time). For each model we discuss our results in 
light of previous studies and we interpret our findings in terms of their policy 
implications. 
Efficiency scores derive from the estimation of input-oriented, CRS DEA models, 
and are bias corrected via bootstrap replications. Specifically, they are calculated with 
respect to a different frontier for each of the six years of the observed period, using 
the FEAR Software Package (Wilson, 2008). The latter computes efficiency scores 
according to Shephard (1970), i.e. as input distance functions. All numerical 
elaborations presented in the paper are based on these values. Differently, in 
presenting and our results we report input efficiency measures according to Farrel 
(1957), i.e., as the reciprocal of the Shephard efficiency score. This representation is 
chosen to facilitate comparison with previous studies.  
 
6.1 Cost-only model 
A concise representation of the results for the Cost-only model is given in Table 5 
where we report the arithmetic average of bias-corrected efficiency scores, by year.  
The average unbiased efficiency over the period is 0.750 (0.736 in 2004 and 0.771 
in 2009), indicating that, given their input, Enel’s Zones could increase their output 
by 25%. These results are partially consistent with the findings of the literature. They 
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are below average scores obtained by Giannakis et al. (2005) and Coelli et al. (2007), 
on data from, respectively, the UK and France (around 82%). However, they are 
above the scores obtained by Growitsch et al. (2010) on Norwegian data (between 
56% and 63%, depending on the year). Of course, comparison with previous studies 
should be taken carefully because of the different choices made in terms of input and 
output variables: Giannakis et al. (2005) and Coelli et al. (2007) include an additional 
output (area size/network length), while Giannakis et al. (2005) and Growitsch et al. 
(2010) use total expenditures (TOTEX) as an input.23  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As all Zones belong to the same company and are subject to the same regulatory 
incentives we are interested in exploring the determinants of the observed 
inefficiencies. Moreover, given that inefficiencies can be the result of bad managerial 
practices as well as of external conditions, it is important, from a regulatory 
perspective, to separate the two effects. To this end, we resort to a second-stage 
regression analysis, using bias-corrected efficiency scores (BC_d
it
) as the dependent 
variable. The model includes three independent variables – area size (area), load 
composition (nonres_cons), average length of feeders (f_length) – and takes the 
following form:  
 
(7)
 
where t are year fixed effects and it is the error term. Results are obtained using a 
truncated regression with bootstrap replications for the bias correction and for the 
confidence intervals.  
The results reported in Table 6 support the hypothesis that the heterogeneity 
observed across distribution units is associated with external factors (a positive 
coefficient suggests a larger distance from the efficient frontier and vice versa). As 
expected, a larger area size and a lower percentage of non-residential consumption 
positively affect a unit’s performance in terms of cost efficiency. The same holds also 
for shorter feeders.  
                                                 
23 Using TOTEX as a the only input (TOTEX model) we obtain an average unbiased efficiency of 
0.672 (between 0.651 and 0.683, depending on the year of observation). The correlation among 
efficiency scores in the Cost-only model and in the TOTEX model is equal to 0.843.  
_  = α0 + α1 ≤_  + α2 ≤+ α3 ≤_  + λ + 
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TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Before analyzing performance over time, note that the residuals of equation (7) 
represent the portion of efficiency that remains unexplained after the correction for 
the external factors, used as independent variables. It is possible to use these residuals 
to level the external variables and derive an adjusted efficiency that is not influenced 
by the external conditions in which each Zone operates. Employing, with the 
necessary modifications, the procedure proposed by De Witte and Moesen (2010), we 
obtain an average adjusted efficiency over the observed period equal to 0.854 (0.832 
in 2004 and 0.886 in 2009). In other words, after accounting for several determinants 
of heterogeneity, our results appear fully consistent with previous studies that use data 
from a single company. In terms of policy, this is a positive result: although 
inefficiencies are still present, managerial performance appears quite homogeneous 
across all Enel’s Zones.  
The question, however, remains on the effect of the regulation of inputs over time, 
or on the company’s response to regulatory incentives aimed at productive efficiency. 
To properly discuss this matter and on the basis of the original Cost-only model, we 
examine productivity changes over time. Average Malmquist indices and their 
components (efficiency change and technical change) are reported in Table 7.  
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
During the observed period, there is evidence of a decrease in productivity and 
both the efficiency and the technical component are, on average, lower than one. In 
other terms, from the perspective of productive efficiency, our analysis shows no 
significant improvements over time (there are no costs reductions that can be passed 
on to consumers). This is consistent with results obtained by Miguéis et al. (2012) and 
also with the Italian regulatory framework. The tariff scheme provides incentives for 
the DSO to achieve higher efficiency in operating costs but allows a pass-through of 
capital expenses and depreciation. In practice, it appears that savings in operating 
costs have been masked by renovation or expansion of distribution assets, a strategy 
that is expected to bring benefits to consumers only in the longer term. 
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6.2 Cost-and-quality models 
To study the effects of price and quality regulation we employ two different 
measures of quality: regulatory rewards and penalties (CostRP model) and the cost of 
the ENS (CostENS model). The arithmetic average of the bias-corrected efficiency, 
for each model and year is reported in Table 8. Before discussing each model in 
detail, a few general remarks are in order.  
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Average efficiency scores observed over the entire period are lower in the CostRP 
model than in the Cost-only model (0.700 vs. 0.750); conversely, differences between 
average efficiency in the Cost-only and the CostENS model are minimal (0.743 vs. 
0.750).  
Table 9 presents the score and ranking (in parentheses) correlation coefficients 
across the three models. Score correlations between the Cost-only and the CostRP 
model are equal to 86.9% and those between the Cost-only and the CostENS models, 
to 82.8%. Notably, the lowest score correlation (77.2%) is between the two cost-and-
quality models. The same holds also for ranking correlations. 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 10 illustrates changes in ranking of single Zones between the Cost-only and 
the two cost-and-quality models. Calculations are made using an average scores, per 
Zone, over the observed period and then dividing the observations in four quartiles. 
The CostRP model does not modify the ranking found in the Cost-only model, 
particularly at the extremes. Rankings are modified for 4% of ‘very cost-efficient’ 
Zones, 21% of ‘very cost-inefficient’ Zones and 34% or less of ‘cost-inefficient’ and 
‘cost-efficient’ Zones. Altogether, out of 114 Zones, only 14 score better and 14 
worse. Similarly, including the cost of ENS in the benchmarking model does not 
significantly modify the ranking of ‘very cost-inefficient’ (21%) and ‘very cost-
efficient’ Zones (32%). Zones in the intermediate ranges appear, instead, to be 
impacted relatively more (48% of ‘cost-inefficient’ and 46% ‘cost-efficient’ Zones). 
On average, out of 114 Zones, 22 score better and 20 worse.  
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TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
6.2.1 CostRP model 
Efficiency scores for the CostRP model are consistent with the hypothesis of a 
larger dispersion in input data. Together with the relative stability in the ranking order 
this indicates that, on average, Zones that are more cost efficient are also good 
performers in terms of exceeding regulatory targets for quality (i.e. they have been 
rewarded by the regulatory mechanism). Also the converse is true: lower cost 
efficiency appears to be associated with lower cost-and-quality efficiency. Changes 
observed over time (2008 and 2009 present higher average values than previous 
years) are consistent with the fact that rewards and penalties decrease at the beginning 
of each regulatory period (a convergence in performance was to be expected).24  
With respect to the literature, our results are in line with those found by Coelli et 
al. (2007): the cost-only model has, at least partially, captured the quality aspect of the 
distribution units. In terms of policy, we infer that in the period under observation the 
presence of quality regulation has not significantly altered the behavior of the 
distribution units: those that responded well to cost efficiency incentives responded 
equally well to quality-related incentives and vice versa. Another interpretation is that 
the company has responded strategically to the regulatory regime, extracting larger 
gains from both price and quality regulation in some distribution Zones and smaller 
ones (or none) in others.25  
The absence of a different response to cost and quality regulatory incentives (or the 
adoption of a strategic behavior on the part of the distribution company) might be 
motivated by fact that the same external conditions that favor cost efficiency also 
influence the ability of distribution unit to attract larger rewards. To test this 
hypothesis we perform a second stage analysis of the bias-corrected efficiency scores 
obtained in the CostRP model, using the same independent variables employed in 
equation (7). Results, obtained with a truncated regression (with bootstrap replications 
for the bias correction and for the confidence intervals), are reported in the first 
                                                 
24 Malmquist indices estimated for the CostRP model exclude, however, any performance change over 
time (the mean over the period is equal to 1.001). 
25 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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column of Table 11. They reveal that a smaller area size, a higher percentage of non-
residential consumption and shorter feeders are associated with smaller distances 
from the efficient frontier. In sum, external factors that favor cost efficiency also 
ensure that the distribution unit collects regulatory rewards (i.e., maintains SAIDI 
below the regulatory target).  
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that a distribution unit responds in the same manner to input-
based and to output-based incentives leads an allocation of quality-related incentives 
that appears in contrast with the long term objective of quality regulation (i.e. 
convergence of SAIDI). To support these statement we compute the average annual 
SAIDI reduction and the average annual rewards and penalties assigned to each Zone. 
Table 12 illustrates these data by different quintiles of the 2004 SAIDI index, i.e. 
ordered by the initial level of quality. Additional information includes the number of 
times when no rewards nor penalties were assigned and the external variables (area 
size, share of non-residential load and average feeder length). 
 
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
We observe that Zones in the first quintile attained relatively small quality 
improvements (0.64 min./year) and yet, collected almost as many rewards as Zones 
whose annual SAIDI improvements were significantly larger (above 3 min./year) – 
clearly rewards were magnified by the share of non-residential load in the same areas. 
In any case, it appears that significant resources were allocated to reward cost-
efficient distribution units (see external variables in Table 12) for providing nearly the 
same level of quality that they delivered in 2004.  
At the same time, Zones in the last two quintiles attained the largest improvements 
in SAIDI (6.09 min./year and 12.52 min./year, respectively) but were able to attract 
less then average rewards. Although annual SAIDI targets are more demanding for 
poor performing areas, it appears that rewards were also limited by a lower share of 
non-residential load. Moreover, these Zones more frequently met, instead of 
exceeding, the regulatory targets, i.e. they received no rewards (or penalties). In sum, 
lower resources were allocated to Zones that presented higher values of SAIDI in 
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2004 as well as the external characteristics of less efficient areas (see external 
variables in Table 12).  
Altogether, this raises some doubts on the efficacy of the current regulatory 
mechanism to reach convergence in SAIDI in the long term. Regulatory incentives for 
quality were never meant as a compensation for quality-related expenditures. 
Nevertheless, our analysis provides strong motivations for the modification of this 
principle and in favor of an incentive scheme where rewards are preferably assigned 
to areas with less favorable external conditions. The role of network structure in 
defining the level of quality also suggests that those incentives should be mainly 
directed at supporting capital expenditures. 
In line with these findings, a change in prospective has been introduced in quality 
regulation for the fourth tariff period. Since January 2012 rewards to high performing 
territorial districts (SAIDI close to the national standard) have been significantly 
reduced, while those to underperforming ones can largely increase if substantial 
improvements in SAIDI are achieved  (AEEG, 2011b).  
Note that what appears as a radical change in perspective implies also a strong 
commitment to meet one of the regulatory objectives set in 2004. As this commitment 
approaches its natural end (in 2015), results from the CostENS model suggest taking a 
different course of action. 
 
6.2.2 CostENS model 
Also for the CostENS model, average efficiency scores (0.743) are in line with 
previous studies. Using SOTEX (TOTEX plus the cost of ENS) as the only input 
Growitsch et al. (2010) find average scores that are between 57% and 62%, depending 
on the year;26 Miguéis et al. (2012) report, instead, average scores above 84% (but 
their model includes additional outputs).  
Consistent with previous work (Growitsch et al., 2010) is also the fact that average 
performance in terms of cost efficiency and average performance in terms of social 
                                                 
26 Using SOTEX as a the only input (SOTEX model) we obtain an average unbiased efficiency of 
0.669 (between 0.642 and 0.698, depending on the year of observation). The correlation among 
efficiency scores in the CostENS model and in the SOTEX model is equal to 0.870.  
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cost efficiency do not significantly differ in our database. Although this does not 
imply that they can not be improved, at least, it excludes a conflict between them.27 
Nevertheless, a relatively low score correlation with the CostRP model (Table 9) 
and the observed changes in ranking correlations with respect to the Cost-only model 
(Table 10) suggests that the CostENS model provides a different perspective on cost-
and-quality efficiency. To illustrate this point, we conduct a second-stage analysis on 
bias-corrected efficiency scores from the CostENS model, using the same independent 
variables as in equation (7). Results, obtained with a truncated regression (with 
bootstrap replications for the bias correction and for the confidence intervals) are 
reported in the second column of Table 11. 
We find that favorable geographical conditions (smaller area) and network design 
(shorter feeders) continue to have significant and positive effect on distribution units’ 
performance. Differently, a higher share of non-residential load continues to have a 
positive effect on performance but becomes less significant: given the same cost 
efficiency level, two Zones can be equally social-cost efficient if one presents a 
relatively high value of SAIDI and a relatively low share of non-residential load and 
the other, instead, a lower SAIDI but a higher share of non-residential load. 
From a research perspective, we infer that while the CostRP model is best suited to 
study how distribution units have responded to the regulatory regime, the CostENS 
model appears as a more equitable choice when assessing their performance in terms 
of (social) cost efficiency and the cost of ENS should be included in benchmarking of 
distribution networks.  
From a policy perspective, we observe that current quality targets in Italy are not 
differentiated on the basis of the cost of ENS in a given area. In turn, this is used to 
calculate rewards and penalties. Therefore, customer valuations of different levels of 
quality (their WTP) enter the distributor’s choice in setting the level of SAIDI, i.e. 
will induce a distribution unit to set different levels of SAIDI in areas with a different 
composition of the load. We infer that a regulatory objective which requires 
convergence in SAIDI performance is inherently at risk whenever the benefit of 
meeting it does not outweigh its cost from a company’s perspective.  
                                                 
27 Changes observed over time even suggests a converge of performance (see Table 8). Malmquist 
indices estimated for the CostENS model exclude, however, any performance change over time (the 
mean over the period is equal to 0.977). 
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Consequently, our policy suggestion for the longer term is to redefine the 
convergence objective in terms of the costs of ENS. This will provide a better 
understanding (also in the public opinion) of the progress of quality regulation and, at 
the same time, remove the incentive to provide the same level of SAIDI in areas 
where the composition of the load does not justify the cost. While this would mean 
accepting a higher SAIDI where the load is mostly residential, in the end it would 
benefit consumers, by ensuring that the level of expenditures in electricity distribution 
does not increase beyond what is socially efficient. 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
Regulation of electricity networks is changing, moving from a productivity-
oriented instrument to one that includes additional, longer term objectives, generally 
pursued with the introduction of output-based incentives. This has prompted interest 
for the assessment of firms’ response to output-based incentives, mostly because of 
their potential conflict with more traditional concerns for productive efficiency.  
In this paper we study the effect of input-based and output-based regulatory 
incentives on the performance of the largest Italian electricity distribution company. 
Specifically, our focus is on assessing progress in terms of cost efficiency and in the 
provision of quality. To this end, we rely on a recent statistical approach, based on 
DEA and bootstrapping techniques, which enable the estimation of technical 
efficiency in the first stage and the study of possible sources of efficiency 
heterogeneity in the second stage. We also employ Malmquist indices to study 
changes in performance over time. 
As for performance in terms of cost efficiency, as implied in the regulation of 
inputs, we find that, once we account for the external characteristics of each 
distribution unit (area served, load composition and network topology), similar efforts 
were exercised across all Enel’s Zones. They were restrained, however, by the need to 
renovate and to expand the distribution system.  
As for performance with respect to the overall regulatory framework we find that 
the presence of (output-based) quality regulation has not significantly modified the 
behavior of the distribution units: those that responded well to cost efficiency 
incentives responded equally well to quality-related incentives and vice versa. Indeed, 
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the same external conditions that favor cost efficiency also influence the ability of a 
distribution unit to exceed the targets imposed by quality regulation. This behavior, 
however, appears in contrast with the long term objective of convergence in SAIDI 
performance.  
Finally, in line with previous literature, we find that average performance in terms 
of cost efficiency and in terms of social cost efficiency do not significantly differ. 
Nevertheless, a comparison with the results obtained with different specifications of 
the benchmarking model indicates that is preferable to include the cost of ENS when 
assessing a single unit’s performance.  
Altogether, the evidence presented in this paper calls for a new course of action in 
quality regulation. Specifically, in order to reach convergence in the desired output 
(SAIDI), the Italian incentive scheme needs to allocate more resources where quality 
improvements are difficult to achieve rather than on rewarding good quality 
performance. As the composition of the load or the area served can hardly be 
modified, incentives should be directed at improving the network design. While the 
national regulator has already taken a step in this direction, our analysis suggests also 
a different conduct. A convergence objective redefined in terms of the cost of ENS 
(rather than SAIDI) would account for differences in load composition and might 
reduce the need to modify the network in areas where consumers’ valuation of quality 
does not justify the cost.  
In this perspective, further work should concentrate on studying the relationship 
between quality-related incentives and expenditure decisions in the electricity 
distribution sector. Also, an estimation of the company’s cost for quality 
improvements would be useful to assess the efficacy of the policy suggestions 
proposed in this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
Acknowledgements 
We thank Cinzia Daraio, Massimo Filippini, Christian Growitsch,	 Janice A. Hauge, 
Stéphane Saussier, Ingo Vogelsang, and participants at the Conference of the 
International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE, Stockholm, 2011), the XII 
European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (EWEPA, 2011), the 
International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM12), Florence 2012, 
the International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC, Boston, 2013) and the 
seminar held at the IAE - Université Paris 1 (Panthéon Sorbonne), the Institute of 
Energy Economics, University of Cologne, and the ACCC/AER seminar in 
Melbourne (AUS), for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Technical and 
financial support from the Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas is 
kindly acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this paper do not represent the 
official position of the Italian Regulatory Authority and do not commit the Authority 
to any course of action in the future. Similarly, the opinions expressed in this paper do 
not represent the official position of Enel Distribuzione and do not commit Enel 
Distribuzione to any course of action in the future. 
  
 29
References 
ACCC/AER – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission & Australian 
Energy Authority, 2012. Benchmarking Capex and Opex in energy markets. 
Available from: www.accc.gov.au. 
AEEG, 2004. Testo integrato delle disposizioni dell'Autorità per l'energia elettrica 
e il gas in materia di qualità dei servizi di distribuzione, misura e vendita dell'energia 
elettrica per il periodo di regolazione 2004-2007. Regulatory Order n. 4/04. 
AEEG, 2007. Testo integrato della regolazione della qualità dei servizi di 
distribuzione, misura e vendita dell’energia elettrica. Regulatory Order n. 333/07. 
AEEG, 2011a. Criteri per la definizione delle tariffe per l’erogazione dei servizi di 
trasmissione, distribuzione e misura dell’energia elettrica per il periodo 2012-2015 - 
Appendice A. Consultation Document DCO 34/11.  
AEEG, 2011b. Testo integrato della qualità dei servizi di distribuzione e misura 
dell’energia elettrica per il periodo di regolazione 2012-2015. Regulatory Order n. 
ARG/elt 198/11. 
Cambini C., Rondi, L., 2010. Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from 
European energy utilities. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 38(1), 1-26. 
Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R., Diewert, W.E., 1982. The economic theory of 
index numbers and the measurement of input, output and productivity. Econometrica, 
50 (6), 1393– 1414. 
Coelli, T., Crespo, H., Paszukiewicz, A., Perelman, S., Plagnet, M.A., Romano, E., 
2007. Incorporating quality of service in a benchmarking model: an application to 
French electricity distribution operators. Proceeding of CIRED, Vienna, Austria, 21-
24 May. 
Coelli, T., Gautier, A., Perelman, S., Saplacan-Pop, R., 2013. Estimating the cost 
of improving quality in electricity distribution: A parametric distance function 
approach. Energy Policy, 53, 287-297. 
Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P., O'Donnel, C.J., Battese, G.E., 2005. An introduction to 
efficiency and productivity analysis, Springer, New York, USA. 
De Witte, K., Moesen, W., 2010. Sizing the government. Public Choice, 145(1-2), 
39-55.  
Dixon, W.J., 1960. Simplified estimation from censored normal samples. Annals 
of Mathematical Statistics, 31(2), 385–91. 
Estache, A., Rossi, M., Ruzzier, C., 2004. The case for international coordination 
of electricity regulation: evidence from the measurement of efficiency in South 
America. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 25(3), 271-295. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M., Zhang, Z., 1994. Productivity growth, 
technical progress, and efficiency change in industrialized countries. The American 
Economic Review, 84 (1), 66–83. 
Farrell, M. J. 1957. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series A (120), 253–81. 
 30
Farsi, M., Filippini, M., 2004. Regulation and measuring cost efficiency with panel 
data models application to electricity distribution utilities. Review of Industrial 
Organization, 25(1), 1-19. 
Farsi, M., Filippini, M., Greene, W., 2006. Application of panel data models in 
benchmarking analysis of the electricity distribution sector. Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 77(3), 271-290. 
Filippini, M., Wild, J., 2001. Regional differences in electricity distribution costs 
and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices. Energy Economics, 
23(4), 477-488. 
Giannakis, D., Jamasb, T., Pollit, M., 2005. Benchmarking and incentive 
regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution 
networks. Energy Policy, 33(17), 2256-2271. 
Glachant, J.M., Khalfallah, H., Perez, Y., Rious, V., Saguan, M., 2012. 
Implementing incentive regulation and regulatory alignment with resource bounded 
regulators. EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2012/31. European University Institute, San 
Domenico di Fiesole, Italy.  
Growitsch, C., Jamasb, T. , Müller, C., Wissner, M., 2010. Social cost-efficient 
service quality - integrating customer valuation in incentive regulation: evidence from 
the case of Norway. Energy Policy, 38(5), 2536-2544. 
Growitsch, C., Jamasb, T., Pollit, M., 2009. Quality of service, efficiency and scale 
in network industries: an analysis of European electricity distribution. Applied 
Economics, 41(20), 2555-2570. 
Haney, A.B., Pollit, M., 2009. Efficiency analysis of energy networks: An 
international survey of regulators. Energy Policy, 37(12), 5814-5830. 
Jamasb, T., Orea, L., Pollit, M., 2012. Estimating the marginal cost of quality 
improvements: The case of the UK electricity distribution companies. Energy 
Economics, 34(5), 1498–1506.  
Jamasb, T., Pollit, M., 2001. Benchmarking and regulation: international electricity 
experience. Utilities Policies, 9(3), 107-130.  
Jamasb, T., Pollit, M., 2003. International benchmarking and regulation: an 
application to European electricity distribution utilities. Energy policy, 31(15), 1609-
1622. 
Joskow, P., 2008. Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity 
Networks. Review of Network Economics, 7(4), -. 
Lo Schiavo, L., Delfanti, M., Fumagalli, E., Olivieri, V., 2013. Changing the 
regulation for regulating the change: Innovation-driven regulatory developments for 
smart grids, smart metering and e-mobility in Italy. Energy Policy, 57, 506-517. 
Miguéis, V.L., Camanho, A.S., Bjørndal, E., Bjørndal, M., 2012. Productivity 
change and innovation in Norwegian electricity distribution companies. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 63, 982–990. 
Ofgem, 2010. Handbook for implementing the RIIO model. Available from: 
www.ofgem.gov.uk. 
Sappington, M., 2005. Regulating service quality: a survey. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 27(2), 123–154. 
 31
Scarsi, G., 1999. Local electricity distribution in Italy: comparative efficiency 
analysis and methodological cross-checking. Mimeo.  
Shephard, R. W. 1970. Theory of cost and production function. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P.W., 2000. Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier 
models: the state of the art. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13(1), 49–78. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P.W., 2007. Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-
parametric models of production processes. Journal of Econometrics, 136(1), 31-64. 
von Hirschhausen, C., Cullmann, A., Kappeler, A., 2006. Efficiency analysis of 
German electricity distribution utilities – non parametric and parametric tests. Applied 
Economics, 38(21), 2553-2566. 
Wilson, P.W., 2008. FEAR 1.0: a software package for frontier efficiency analysis 
with R. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 42 (4), 247-254. 
 
  
 32
Table 1. Benchmarking with quality in electricity distribution 
 Input variables 
Output 
variables 
Quality 
variables Database 
Benchmarking 
approach 
Jamasb and 
Pollit (2003) 
OPEX; 
TOTEX; 
(Network 
length) 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers; 
(Network 
length) 
Energy losses 
Cross-section 
1999 
International 
DEA, COLS and 
SFA 
von 
Hirschhausen 
et al. (2006) 
Labour; 
Network 
length; Peak 
load capacity 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers; 
Inverse 
density index 
Energy losses 
Cross-section 
2001 
National 
SFA and DEA 
Growitsch et 
al. (2009) TOTEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers 
CML 
Cross-section 
2002 
International 
SFA 
Giannakis et 
al. (2005) 
OPEX; 
TOTEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers; 
Network 
length 
NINT and 
TINT 
Panel 
1991/92 – 
1998/99 
National 
DEA and 
Malmquist Index 
Coelli et al. 
(2007) 
Capital 
replacement 
value, OPEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers; 
Network 
length 
NINT 
Panel 
2003-2005 
One company 
SFA and DEA 
Miguéis et al. 
(2012) SOTEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers, 
others 
Cost of ENS 
Panel 
2004-2007 
National 
DEA and 
Malmquist Index 
Growitsch et 
al. (2010) 
TOTEX, 
SOTEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers 
Cost of ENS 
Panel 
2001-2004 
National 
DEA 
Coelli et al. 
(2013) 
Capital 
replacement 
value, OPEX 
Energy 
supplied; 
Num. 
customers; 
Area size 
NINT 
Panel 
2003-2005 
National 
SFA, Parametric 
Linear 
Programming 
Note: CML: Customer Minutes lost; NINT: Number of Interruptions; TINT: Duration of interruptions; ENS: 
Energy Not Served; OPEX: Operating expenditures; TOTEX: Operating and capital expenditures; SOTEX: 
TOTEX plus Cost of ENS. 
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Table 2. Input and output variables in DEA models 
DEA Model Input Output
Cost-only capital (€)opcost (€) 
energy (GWh)
LVcons 
CostRP capital (€)opcost_RP (€) 
energy (GWh)
LVcons 
CostENS capital (€)opcost_ENS (€) 
energy (GWh)
LVcons 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on input and output DEA variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Zones
energy (GWh) 1,756 1,162 307 5,876 114 
LVcons 264,456 140,351 60,275 693,154 114 
capital (mln€) 263.89 121.58 78.54 705.47 114 
opcost (mln€) 17.21 8.56 4.13 50.48 114 
SAIDI (min) 56.55 31.58 10.42 194.28 114 
RP (mln€) 0.89 1.16 -3.19 9.05 114 
C_ENS (mln€) 3.17 2.34 0.14 15.30 114 
opcost_RP (mln€) 16.33 8.36 3.66 48.77 114 
opcost_ENS (mln€) 20.38 10.39 4.37 57.75 114 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on input and output DEA variables: mean and 
relative standard deviation (%) per year  
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
energy (GWh) 1,685 1,719 1,782 1,787 1,826 1,736 
67.08% 66.48% 66.43% 66.59% 66.58% 64.96% 
LVcons 257,460 260,344 264,054 269,183 266,781 268,912 
53.26% 53.24% 53.26% 53.29% 53.18% 53.17% 
capital (mln€) 246.54 253.16 259.92 265.94 275.35 282.45 
45.94% 45.95% 45.80% 45.98% 46.00% 46.02% 
opcost (mln€) 19.17 17.11 17.50 15.83 15.59 18.08 
48.85% 47.96% 48.29% 49.86% 50.11% 50.50% 
SAIDI (min) 73.56 66.83 51.06 48.59 51.54 47.73 
50.65% 55.03% 51.57% 58.35% 47.07% 51.63% 
RP (mln€) 0.55 1.02 1.38 1.58 0.47 0.33 
105.57% 104.45% 105.83% 98.42% 121.65% 193.56% 
C_ENS (mln€) 4.03 3.54 2.95 2.79 3.03 2.69 
74.02% 64.78% 72.77% 78.14% 68.23% 74.51% 
opcost_RP (mln€) 18.62 16.1 16.12 14.25 15.12 17.76 
49.39% 48.52% 50.00% 53.57% 50.24% 51.15% 
opcost_ENS (mln€)
23.19 20.65 20.45 18.61 18.62 20.77 
49.34% 48.18% 49.95% 52.15% 51.39% 52.24% 
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Table 5. Efficiency scores in the Cost-only model 
Year Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
2004 0.736 0.085 0.500 0.889 
2005 0.715 0.079 0.514 0.883 
2006 0.751 0.076 0.541 0.901 
2007 0.767 0.072 0.539 0.918 
2008 0.760 0.072 0.502 0.922 
2009 0.771 0.073 0.581 0.937 
Mean 0.750 0.079 0.500 0.937 
Efficiency scores are bias corrected via boostrap (2000 replications) 
 
Table 6. Second stage regression (Cost-only model)  
 Efficiency scores
area 0.026 ***
 (0.005)  
nonres_cons - 0.267 ***
 (0.082)  
f_lenght 0.019 ***
 (0.003)  
2004 0.069 ***
 (0.020)  
2005 0.111 ***
 (0.018)  
2006 0.041 **
 (0.018)  
2007 0.011  
 (0.017)  
2008 0.023  
 (0.017)  
const. 1.350 ***
 (0.069)  
n.obs 684  
n. Zones 114  
***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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Table 7. Malmquist indices (Cost-only model) 
Year Malmquist EF TC 
2004-05 0.893 1.023 0.873 
2005-06 1.005 0.957 1.050 
2006-07 0.887 1.981 0.904 
2007-08 0.990 1.008 0.982 
2008-09 1.154 0.992 1.164 
Mean 0.986 0.992 0.995 
Indices are bias corrected via boostrap (2000 replications)  
 
Table 8. Efficiency scores in CostRP and CostENS models 
 CostRP model CostENS model 
Year Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max 
2004 0.703 0.089 0.457 0.878 0.689 0.106 0.382 0.897 
2005 0.664 0.094 0.447 0.877 0.706 0.107 0.423 0.918 
2006 0.676 0.102 0.417 0.915 0.749 0.089 0.503 0.938 
2007 0.675 0.101 0.414 0.905 0.752 0.089 0.470 0.926 
2008 0.733 0.080 0.468 0.922 0.778 0.091 0.502 0.953 
2009 0.748 0.079 0.543 0.927 0.786 0.082 0.545 0.975 
Mean 0.700 0.096 0.414 0.927 0.743 0.100 0.382 0.975 
Efficiency scores are bias corrected via boostrap (2000 replications) 
 
Table 9. Score and ranking (in parenthesis) correlations among DEA models  
 Cost-only CostRP CostENS
Cost-only 1 
    
    
CostRP 
0.869 ***
1 
  
(0.859)    
CostENS 
0.828 *** 0.772 ***
1 
(0.842)  (0.803)  
***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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Table 10. Changes in raking order  
    Cost only 
    Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Very inefficient 
Cost-RP 
Very efficient 25 86% 4 14% 0 0% 0 0% 
Efficient 4 14% 19 68% 5 17% 0 0% 
Inefficient 0 0% 5 18% 19 66% 5 18% 
Very inefficient 0 0% 0 0% 5 17% 23 82% 
  Tot. 29 100% 28 100% 29 100% 28 100% 
    Cost only 
    Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Very inefficient 
Cost-ENS 
Very efficient 23 79% 6 21% 0 0% 0 0% 
Efficient 5 17% 15 54% 7 24% 1 4% 
Inefficient 1 3% 5 18% 15 52% 8 29% 
Very inefficient 0 0% 2 7% 7 24% 19 68% 
  Tot. 29 100% 28 100% 29 100% 28 100% 
Percentage values are rounded 
 
Table 11. Second stage analysis (CostRP and CostENS models)  
 CostRP model CostENS model 
area  0.041 *** 0.038 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
nonres_cons -0.565 *** -0.201 * 
 (0.105)  (0.119)  
f_length 0.029 *** 0.021 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
2004 0.102 *** 0.243 *** 
 (0.023)  (0.034)  
2005 0.203 *** 0.203 *** 
 (0.024)  (0.031)  
2006 0.187 *** 0.094 *** 
 (0.027)  (0.024)  
2007 0.192 *** 0.086 *** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  
2008 0.041 * 0.027  
 (0.021)  (0.026)  
const. 1.511 *** 1.199 *** 
 (0.090)  (0.105)  
n.obs 684 684 
n. Zones 114 114 
***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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Table 12. Average annual SAIDI reduction and RP by SAIDI 2004 quintiles 
Quintiles SAIDI 
2004 
Annual 
SAIDI 
reduction 
Annual 
Rewards 
Annual 
Penalties 
Zero RP area nonres_cons f_length 
 [min] [min] [mln€] [mln€] [N. obs.] [km2] [%] [km/MVA] 
Q1 
18.70 - 
40.56 0.64 1.08 0.15 0 1789*103 0.77 3.33 
Q2 
40.56 - 
59.83 3.08 1.15 0.45 1 2825*103 0.74 3.59 
Q3 
59.83 - 
77.39 3.81 1.34 0.41 8 2468*103 0.72 4.02 
Q4 
77.39 - 
98.18 6.09 0.88 0.48 11 2541*103 0.68 4.57 
Q5 
98.18 - 
194.28 12.52 0.89 0.40 24 2826*103 0.68 5.18 
Mean - 5.17 1.08 0.42 - 2487*103 0.72 4.13 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix we analyze the determinants of the continuity indicator SAIDI 
and, in particular, we focus on interruptions that occur at Medium Voltage (MV) level 
(a measure that include most of the customer minutes lost in a given area). To this 
end, estimate the following model (Model A): 
 
 
(A.1)
 
The dependent variable is the SAIDI indicator used in the paper, net of 
interruptions events that originated on the low voltage network (SAIDI_MV). The 
explanatory variables are the average length of feeders per substation (f_length), 
network length at MV level (km_MV) and the percentage of non-residential energy 
consumption over total consumption (nonres_cons). Annual dummy variables are 
included to control for time-variant fixed effects (t). 
As explained in Section 5.3, a larger value for the variable f_length is expected to 
increase SAIDI. Similarly, a longer network indicates a more dispersed distribution 
area and is expected to be associated with longer interruption durations (longer supply 
restoration times). On the contrary, a larger share of non-residential load is expected 
to be associated with lower values of SAIDI (non-residential consumers have a higher 
valuation of quality).  
Results, obtained with a Random Effect model, are reported in Table A.1: Model 
A-I includes only the technical variables (f_length and km_MV); Model A-II considers 
also the composition of the load (nonres_cons).  
In Model A-I, the coefficient on f_length is, as expected, positive and statistically 
significant; differently, the coefficient for the variable km_MV has the expected sign, 
but it is statistically insignificant. Model A-II confirms the effect on SAIDI_MV of the 
variable f_length, althought at a lower significance level; it also shows that a higher 
share of non-residential load has the expected negative and significant effect upon 
SAIDI at MV level. Finally, the annual dummy variables indicate that the variable 
SAIDI_MV decreased over the observed period. 
  
_  = α0+α1≤_ +α2≤_ +α3≤_ +λ+ 
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Table A.1 Determinants of continuity indicator SAIDI at MV level 
 Model A-I Model A-II 
    
f_length 3.132*** 1.620* 
  (0.953) (0.956) 
km_MV 0.002 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
nonres_cons  - -97.531*** 
 - (24.720) 
2004 26.043*** 25.641*** 
  (2.505) (2.560) 
2005 19.127*** 19.310*** 
  (2.132) (2.125) 
2006 4.661*** 5.231*** 
  (0.896) (0.908) 
2007 1.938** 2.714*** 
  (0.851) (0.852) 
2008 1.194 2.238* 
  (1.229) (1.201) 
const. 13.022*** 91.062*** 
  (4.998) (19.340) 
    
N. obs. 684 684
N. Zones 114 114
***, **, and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 
